Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship
7-2006

Why Constitutional Rights Litigation Should Not Follow the Flag
Julian Ku
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Julian Ku, Why Constitutional Rights Litigation Should Not Follow the Flag, 28:2 N.S.L.R 1 (2006)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/1282

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra
Law. For more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

Vol. 28, No. 2

American Bar Association National Security Law Report

July 2006

American Bar Association

National Security Law Report
Volume 28, Number 2

STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY

July 2006

Editor’s Note: In this issue we present commentary on a range of interesting developments in the field of national
security law. First, we have Professor Julian Ku of Hofstra University School of Law and Professor Stephen I.
Vladeck of the University of Miami School of Law debating the merits of a little-noticed but immensely important
recent opinion. In Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp.2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), the court dismissed a civil suit brought by a
Canadian citizen who alleged that the U.S. government caused him to be transferred to Syria in order to undergo
torture and other forms of coercive interrogation; the court held among other things that national security and
foreign policy considerations foreclosed consideration of Arar’s constitutional claims. We also present the views of
Professor Tung Yin of the University of Iowa College of Law regarding developments in the case of Jose Padilla,
whose petition for certiorari recently was denied by the Supreme Court. Finally, we present an edited version of a
speech titled “Legal Policy in the Twilight of War,” delivered by Dr. Philip D. Zelikow, currently Counselor at the
State Department and formerly Staff Director of the 9/11 Commission, at a recent Standing Committee breakfast event.

Rights Without Remedies: The
Newfound National Security
Exception to Bivens

Why Constitutional Rights Litigation
Should Not Follow the Flag
Julian Ku
Since the onset of the global war on terrorism in
2001, non-U.S. citizens have repeatedly asked
U.S. courts to recognize and enforce their rights
under the U.S. Constitution. Such claims have been
brought by aliens detained by the U.S. at overseas
bases or in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. They have
also been brought by non-U.S. citizens alleging they
have been “rendered” to foreign countries for
inhumane interrogation or detained in secret CIA
prisons. Such claims raise a difficult but absolutely
essential legal question for the ongoing prosecution
of the global war on terrorism: Can U.S. courts
entertain lawsuits alleging that the U.S.
government’s foreign policy actions violated the
constitutional rights of non-U.S. citizens?
One of the best efforts to resolve this difficult
question can be found in U.S. District Court Judge
David Trager’s recent decision in Arar v. Ashcroft,
et. al. In that case, Judge Trager dismissed a
complaint by a non-U.S. citizen seeking damages
for violations of his constitutional rights when he
was subject to an “extraordinary rendition” to a
foreign country.

Stephen I. Vladeck
Few stories—that we know of, anyway—are as
depressing a reminder of just how much the world
has changed since September 11 as is the tale of
Maher Arar. According to the preliminary factfinding of the official inquiry conducted by the
Canadian government (the final report is due out
later this year), Arar was detained in September
2002 while changing planes on his way home at
New York’s Kennedy Airport, and after thirteen
days of incommunicado detention under unpleasant
conditions in New York, was removed to Syria,
where he had not lived since he was a teenager, so
that he could be detained and tortured by the
Syrian government at the direction and behest of
U.S. authorities. In Syria, he spent over ten months
in custody, suffering from mistreatment that makes
the reported Abu Ghraib transgressions sound
positively humane.
And yet, when all was said and done, Arar was
released and sent home; the U.S. government, it
would seem, no longer saw him as a threat.
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Judge Trager could not have chosen a more difficult
set of facts, however, in which to take this position.
Unless he is a remarkable liar, Maher Arar, the
plaintiff, has suffered a terrible injustice. Arar, a
dual citizen of Syria and Canada, has alleged that he
was wrongly detained as a suspected terrorist
during his transit through the U.S. and purposely
handed over to the Syrian government for interrogation. Arar then charges that he was tortured and
abused during ten-month confinement before he
was finally released to the custody of the Canadian
government. Arar has become a public symbol of
the abuses resulting in the unofficial U.S. government policy of “extraordinary rendition.” His case
was taken up by the Center for Constitutional
Rights which sued various U.S. government officials
charging they are responsible for his abuses.
The power of Arar’s case, both as a story of
individual suffering and as a potent challenge to a
highly controversial U.S. government policy, only
highlights how difficult it must have been for Judge
Trager to dismiss Arar’s lawsuit. Although Arar
filed claims under a federal statute, the Torture
Victim Protection Act (TVPA), the bulk of his
claims allege that his treatment violated his constitutional right to substantive due process under the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
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counseling hesitation” where a Bivens remedy
would trammel on a matter best decided by either
the Congress or the President. The traditional
dominance of Congress and the President over the
conduct of foreign policy, as Judge Trager correctly
recognized, represents exactly the kind of special
situation where a judicially-created Bivens remedy
would be inappropriate.
For instance, the policy of “extraordinary renditions” that Arar is seeking to challenge is not even
officially acknowledged by the U.S. government.
The merits of such a policy to render suspected
terrorists to foreign countries involves a wide variety
of difficult considerations such as the likelihood of
gleaning information about a future terrorist attack,
the coordination of law-enforcement efforts, and the
relationship of the U.S. with a variety of foreign
governments. Even defending such a policy in a
domestic litigation (a policy which is supposedly a
secret) could undermine the efficacy of the U.S.
government’s foreign policy goals.
Arar and his attorneys might respond by arguing
that any U.S. government policy, no matter how
important, must comply with the restrictions imposed by the U.S. Constitution. The protection of
the Constitution, it might be said, should follow the
THE ABA NATIONAL SECURITY LAW REPORT
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These constitutionally-based claims were invoked
by Arar pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents to create
private causes of actions for plaintiffs to bring claims
that their constitutional rights had been violated.
Crucially for Arar, Bivens permits such private
lawsuits to be brought even if Congress has not
passed legislation specifically authorizing such a
private constitutional claim.
Because Bivens claims displace Congress’ traditional power to control the creation private causes
of action under federal law, however, the Supreme
Court has asked courts to consider “special factors
—2—
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flag, at least where the violation of fundamental
constitutional rights is alleged.
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even customary international law. But it has no
power to modify or adjust constitutional rights
recognized by domestic U.S. courts. Such rights
are the sole province of the courts.

This argument is powerful, but it is not irrefutable.
First, the right of aliens to invoke the Constitution
against U.S. actions overseas has never received
unqualified, or even qualified, support from the
Supreme Court. As a pragmatic matter, this is
hardly surprising given the traditional notions of a
country’s laws being limited to the territory of that
country.

The judiciary’s supreme position in the interpretation and development of constitutional rights would
also require courts to inject themselves directly into
the supervision of certain aspects of U.S. foreign
policy. If courts recognized the right of aliens to
bring claims for constitutional violations for actions
occurring overseas, courts would have no choice
but to sit in judgment on decisions of the most
delicate and complex nature. Once recognized,
constitutional rights cannot be repealed.

Second, even if such constitutional protections
extend overseas to non-Americans, the decision as
to whether and how to enforce those rights is not
solely a question for the U.S. judicial branch.
When and whether an individual can bring a private
cause of action in U.S. courts has traditionally been
a question for Congress, not the courts, and Bivens
represents a limited departure from this standard
rule.

For example, Arar appears to have a very strong
case for arguing that his constitutional rights were
violated. But because Arar was in transit and never
officially entered United States territory, finding that
Arar has enforceable constitutional rights would
also mean extending constitutional rights to all aliens
outside of the United States, including suspected
terrorists that the U.S. is currently attempting to
capture or kill. One might imagine that U.S.
policymakers would reasonably want the freedom
to act more aggressively in some circumstances free
from the supervision of courts. But even if the
executive and legislative branches agreed, for
instance, to attack individuals such as Osama Bin
Laden or Abu al Zarqawi, U.S. federal courts
would always be in a position to overrule their
decisions on the basis of the Constitution.

Finally, when the U.S. government takes actions
abroad that involve non-U.S. citizens, it already
faces a panoply of legal constraints. First and
foremost, any U.S. activity occurring in another
country must satisfy the requirement of that
country’s domestic laws. Moreover, U.S. government actions are also constrained by its obligations
under treaties it has entered and the various forms
of customary international law to which it is bound.
Finally, in many instances, the U.S. government’s
activities abroad are governed by the requirements
of federal statutory law. In other words, when the
U.S. government acts abroad, it is hardly unconstrained by laws – not to mention its political
relations with other countries.
Adding constitutional limitations on U.S. actions
abroad via a judicially created Bivens action,
however, is radically different from these other legal
constraints. Unlike the other kinds of legal limitations on U.S. foreign policy, constitutional requirements cannot be repealed, abrogated or modified
by a decision of the political branches of the U.S.
government. Congress can repeal its own earlier
statute or abrogate the domestic effect of a treaty or

All of these reasons suggest that Judge Trager was
right to refuse to permit Arar to enforce claims to
protection under the U.S. Constitution for actions
taken by the U.S. government abroad. The U.S.
government may very well decide that allowing
aliens to challenge U.S. government actions in U.S.
courts is the best way to oversee and regulate the
conduct of the global war on terrorism. But such a
momentous decision to subject almost all foreign
policy activity to constitutional litigation should, as
Judge Trager recognized, be made by Congress.
Julian G. Ku is a law professor at Hofstra University School of Law.
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